Sommario: 

1. La struttura reticolare del mercato europeo dell’energia. 

2. Natura delle cose, organizzazione, procedimento. 

3. Una multiforme varietà procedimentale. 

3.1. Rulemaking. 

3.2. Enforcement. 

3.2.1. La repressione degli abusi di mercato. 

3.2.2. La certificazione dei gestori di rete. 

3.3. Conflicts Resolution. 

4. Profili di tutela giurisdizionale.

5. Conclusioni.

Abstract:

The internal energy market is characterized by a network structure, both from a physical (transportation networks) and juridical (cross border contracts) perspective. Based on that empirical evidence, this paper shows how the market can be effectively regulated through a polycentric governance model (ACER is a networked agency) thanks to compound proceedings of regulation, enforcement and conflict resolution wherein both European and national authorities are involved. With regard to regulation, the network code elaboration process is specifically analyzed and the network code is interpreted as the outcome of a polycentric and multi-phase rule making network, involving many actors both at a national and supra-national level, public and private: NRAs (National Regulatory Authorities), ACER, TSOs (European Network of Transmission System Operators, ENTSO), final users, the European Commission and Member States. With regard to enforcement, attention is paid to Regulation (EU) n. 1227/2011 (so called Remit – Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integry and Trasparency). According to this provision, NRAs play a role of ACER’s “assistant” in the monitoring phase, while they have an operational/executive role in the control and sanction phase. Finally, with regard to conflict resolution, this paper sheds light on ACER’s arbitration, foreseen in article 8 of Regulation n. 713/2009. In this case, the European administrative network is not used only to issue rules and enforce them, but also to solve dispute among regulators. The last part of this paper is focused on jurisdictional protection profiles and in particular on issues stemming from the European jurisdictional pluralism. Indeed, national courts cannot easily control the technical assessments made by European bodies and as a consequence they can hardly check whether measures adopted complies with the proportionality principle.