Abstract:

The essay analyses the makings of the new institutional role of the Corte dei conti, which, far from still being a mere controller of public funds expenditure, became a supervisor of the adequacy of the financial and organizational resources usage. There are many reasons for this: the tight connection between the functionality of the administrative activity and that of the economic resources; the ever-growing number of acts to be transmitted to the Court; the constant jurisprudential reference to the principles of functionality and efficiency. However, the acknowledgement of the synergy between the activity of public bodies and the quality control of that action carried out by the Court must not lead to the acceptance of a potential confusion or duplication of roles. On the one hand, even if the jurisdiction can examine the outcome of the public activity (through the use of the reasonableness principle) it can’t be extended to the opportunity of the administrative choice. On the other hand, both the control and judicial activities can’t influence the administrative decision-making process.